The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis (...) of this notion, we will clarify what distinguishes constitutive mechanistic explanations from etiological ones. 1 Introduction 2 Criteria of Adequacy 2.1 Descriptive adequacy 2.2 Constitutive–etiological distinction 2.3 Constitution 3 The Ontological Nature of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena 3.1 Phenomena as input–output relations 3.2 Phenomena as end states 3.3 Phenomena as dispositions 3.4 Phenomena as behaviours 4 Phenomena as Object-Involving Occurrents 4.1 What object-involving occurrents are and why we need them 4.2 The object in the phenomenon 4.3 The adequacy of option 5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Back cover: This book develops a philosophical account that reveals the major characteristics that make an explanation in the life sciences reductive and distinguish them from non-reductive explanations. Understanding what reductive explanations are enables one to assess the conditions under which reductive explanations are adequate and thus enhances debates about explanatory reductionism. The account of reductive explanation presented in this book has three major characteristics. First, it emerges from a critical reconstruction of the explanatory practice of the life sciences itself. (...) Second, the account is monistic since it specifies one set of criteria that apply to explanations in the life sciences in general. Finally, the account is ontic in that it traces the reductivity of an explanation back to certain relations that exist between objects in the world (such as part-whole relations and level relations), rather than to the logical relations between sentences. Beginning with a disclosure of the meta-philosophical assumptions that underlie the author’s analysis of reductive explanation, the book leads into the debate about reduction(ism) in the philosophy of biology and continues with a discussion on the two perspectives on explanatory reduction that have been proposed in the philosophy of biology so far. The author scrutinizes how the issue of reduction becomes entangled with explanation and analyzes two concepts, the concept of a biological part and the concept of a level of organization. The results of these five chapters constitute the ground on which the author bases her final chapter, developing her ontic account of reductive explanation. (shrink)

This Philosophy Compass article continues the comparison between Confucian and mainstream Western views of personhood and their connection with ethics begun in Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition I: Fundamental Concepts , by focusing on the Western self conceived as an independent agent with moral and political rights. More specifically, the present article briefly accounts for how the more strictly and explicitly individualistic notion of self dominating Western philosophy has developed, leading up to a recent debate in modern (...) Western rights theory between Herbert Fingarette and Henry Rosemont, Jr., two contemporary Western philosophers who are both steeped in Confucian thought as well as moral and political philosophy. This discussion elucidates how Confucianism can be compared to, and even contrasted with some basic principles of modern Western rights theory and the more individualistic view of self they entail. In the end, a new view of personhood and "free will"? is offered that synthesizes insights from the Confucian treatment of persons as being essentially interdependent with the Western treatment of persons as being essentially independent. (shrink)

Mechanisms are said to consist of two kinds of components, entities and activities. In the first half of this chapter, I examine what entities and activities are, how they relate to well-known ontological categories, such as processes or dispositions, and how entities and activities relate to each other (e.g., can one be reduced to the other or are they mutually dependent?). The second part of this chapter analyzes different criteria for individuating the components of mechanisms and discusses how real the (...) boundaries of mechanisms are. (shrink)

This paper examines the adequacy of causal graph theory as a tool for modeling biological phenomena and formalizing biological explanations. I point out that the causal graph approach reaches it limits when it comes to modeling biological phenomena that involve complex spatial and structural relations. Using a case study from molecular biology, DNA-binding and -recognition of proteins, I argue that causal graph models fail to adequately represent and explain causal phenomena in this field. The inadequacy of these models is due (...) to their failure to include relevant spatial and structural information in a way that does not render the model non-explanatory, unmanageable, or inconsistent with basic assumptions of causal graph theory. (shrink)

Leuridan (2011) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mech-anistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see e.g. Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 1996; MDC 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2003; Weber 2005). In our view, Leuridan (...) misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim, that all causal claims require laws, is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation and control. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the encyclopedia of systems biology on complexity.

What are the conditions under which one biological object is a part of another biological object? This paper answers this question by developing a general, systematic account of biological parthood. I specify two criteria for biological parthood. Substantial Spatial Inclusionrequires biological parts to be spatially located inside or in the region that the natural boundary of t he biological whole occupies. Compositional Relevance captures the fact that a biological part engages in a biological process that must make a necessary contribution (...) to a condition that is minimally sufficient to one or more of the characteristic behaviors of the biological whole. Instead of emphasizing the diversity of part-whole relations in the biological world, this paper asks what biological part-whole relations have in common and what constrains their existence, in general. After presenting the two criteria for biological parthood I discuss in how far my account can cope with hard cases (e.g., redundant parts) and I reveal the merits and limits of monism. (shrink)

Confucianism conceives of persons as being necessarily interdependent, defining personhood in terms of the various roles one embodies and that are established by the relationships basic to one's life. By way of contrast, the Western philosophical tradition has predominantly defined persons in terms of intrinsic characteristics not thought to depend on others. This more strictly and explicitly individualistic concept of personhood contrasts with the Confucian idea that one becomes a person because of others; where one is never a person independently (...) or in and of oneself but develops into one only in community. This article surveys some differences between Confucian and Western ideas of self and their connection to ethics mainly in light of the relational self of the Confucian Analects and Mencius . A Philosophy Compass article called Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition II: A Comparative Analysis of Personhood will follow, that examines how the more individualistic way of conceiving of personhood in the West has had moral and political implications that differ, and even conflict, with those of Confucianism. (shrink)

Individuals of many animal species are said to have a personality. It has been shown that some individuals are bolder than other individuals of the same species, or more sociable or more aggressive. In this paper, we analyse what it means to say that an animal has a personality. We clarify what an animal personality is, that is, its ontology, and how different personality concepts relate to each other, and we examine how personality traits are identified in biological practice. Our (...) analysis shows that biologists often study specific personality traits, such as boldness, sociability or aggressiveness, rather than personalities in general. We claim that personality traits are best understood as dispositions and that they are operationally defined in terms of certain sets of behaviours, which are studied in specific experimental set-ups. Furthermore, we develop an integrative philosophical account that specifies and formalises three criteria for identifying personality traits, which are used in biological practice. For an individual animal to have a personality trait it must, first, behave differently than others. Second, these behavioural differences must be stable over a certain time, and third, they must be consistent in different contexts. (shrink)

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. (...) Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative. (shrink)

This article explains how li 禮 or ‘ritual propriety’ is the ‘body language’ of ren 仁 or the authentic expression of our humanity. Li and ren are interdependent aspects of a larger creative human way (rendao 仁道) that can be conceptually distinguished as follows: li refers to the ritualized social form of appropriate conduct and ren to the more general, authentically human spirit this expresses. Li is the social instrument for self-cultivation and the vehicle of harmonious human interaction. More, li (...) must mean something that is effectively communicated to others for an authentic, human (ren) interaction to occur. Li is the body language of ren in being the ritual vehicle for its’ expression; however, li is underdetermined by ren and so must be distinguished from it in on further grounds: authentic human activity must not just be equivocated with social convention because conclusively establishing whether a particular action is li (or is a truly ren action) is impossible. As a result, li is often confused with social power and privilege that is easier to empirically identify than ren conduct is, but this is a mistake since li has to express ren or it is not li at all. The inescapable ambiguity of li – an ambiguity that attaches to any language – can be critiqued by the Western view that sees something ‘essential’ to the ‘self,’ and that makes one a ‘self’ in and of oneself and not in a way that depends on others. I show that such Western individualism – while resting on a fundamentally different way of thinking of being a person and living a good life – does not reduce Confucian ritual to being an instrument for social discrimination and subordination. My argument is indebted to twentieth-century philosophy of language in the West that offered the idea that some words are actions. (shrink)

In the contemporary life sciences more and more researchers emphasize the “limits of reductionism” (e.g. Ahn et al. 2006a, 709; Mazzocchi 2008, 10) or they call for a move “beyond reductionism” (Gallagher/Appenzeller 1999, 79). However, it is far from clear what exactly they argue for and what the envisioned limits of reductionism are. In this paper I claim that the current discussions about reductionism in the life sciences, which focus on methodological and explanatory issues, leave the concepts of a reductive (...) method and a reductive explanation too unspecified. In order to fill this gap and to clarify what the limits of reductionism are I identify three reductive methods that are crucial in the current practice of the life sciences: decomposition, focusing on internal factors, and studying parts in isolation. Furthermore, I argue that reductive explanations in the life sciences exhibit three characteristics: first, they refer only to factors at a lower level than the phenomenon at issue, second, they focus on internal factors and thus ignore or simplify the environment of a system, and, third, they cite only the parts of a system in isolation. (shrink)

Herbert Fingarett's achievements range from his assault upon the misconceived 'disease theory' of alchoholism, through social philosophy, philosophy of law, and philosophical psychology, to Chinese studies and Confucian thought. Fingarette's major works include 'The Self in Transformation' (1963), 'Self-Deception' (1969), 'Confucius---The Secular as Sacred' (1972), and 'The Meaning of Criminal Insanity' (1972). His Book, 'Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alchoholism as a Disease' (1988), transformed the public debate on alchohol treatment and made Fingarette the target of an intense barrage of (...) abuse and vituperation from entrepreneurs in the alchohol-treatment industry. 'Rules, Rituals, and Responsibilities' contains Fingarette's intellectual autobiography, nine papers by leading scholars on different aspects of Fingarette's thought, and Fingarette's response to each of these papers. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it is finally time to move beyond the Nagelian framework and to break new ground in thinking about epistemic reduction in biology. I will do so, not by simply repeating all the old objections that have been raised against Ernest Nagel’s classical model of theory reduction. Rather, I grant that a proponent of Nagel’s approach can handle several of these problems but that, nevertheless, Nagel’s general way of thinking about epistemic reduction in terms of (...) theories and their logical relations is entirely inadequate with respect to what is going on in actual biological research practice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIND FORMING AND MANUDUCTIO IN AQUINAS* MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York QUINAS'S CONCERN for pedagogy is plain from his explicit discussions of the subject, the most noteworthy of which is found in the preface to the Summa Theologiae. His qualities as a teacher of beginning students have been brought out by numerous modern authors, among whom are Josef Pieper,1 who underlines both Thomas's ability to (...) arouse wonder and his use of ordinary language intelligible to all, and James Weisheipl,2 who points out that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle reveal a concern for the neophyte who is trying to comprehend the relation between faith and reason. One important aspect of Aquinas's teaching on pedagogy generally does not get the attention it merits, however, and this is the need for ' manuductio.' 3 ' Manuductio ', or ' xeipaywv£a ' (literally, 'leading by the hand') is an expression which Aquinas *This paper was read at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies, Villanova University, Pennsylvania, September 1991. 1 Cf. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962)' c. 8. 2 Cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 281. 3 This article drew much of its inspiration from the works of Msgr. Maurice Dionne, a thinker who both elaborated upon and consciously implemented Aquinas's teachings on this subject. Cf. especially: Initation a la logique, ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance inc., 1976), and La N ecessite de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles, ed. Louis Brunet, vol. 1 (Quebec: Societe d'Etudes Aristoteliciennes 1980), hereafter cited as La N ec. 201 202 MARIE I. GEORGE adopts from Dionysius.4 It is a word that has different but related meanings in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual orders. Our intention is to elucidate the thomistic doctrine of ' leadingby -the-hand ' in the context of intellectual education, or ' mind forming,' discussing its nature, its necessity, and its place in the global picture of human knowing as outlined by Aquinas. We will begin by delineating in general what manuductio is by comparing two key passages, the first of which is to be found in the Summa Theologiae: The teacher leads the students from what is already known to knowledge of things unknown in two ways. First, by putting before him certain aids or instruments which his intellect uses in order to acquire science ; for example, when he presents him with some less universal proposition which nevertheless the student is able to judge from things already known; or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, or similitudes, or opposites, or some other things of this sort, from which the intellect of the learner is ' led by the hand ' (manuducitur) to the knowledge of a truth previously unknown to him. The other way [the teacher leads the student] is when he strengthens the intellect of the learner... inasmuch as he proposes the order of principles to conclusions to the student, who perhaps by himself would not have so much ability to put things together (virtutem collativam) that from the principles he could deduce the conclusions. And therefore it is said in Posterior Analytics. Bk. I, that 'demonstration is a syllogism making one know '. And through this mode the one who demonstrates makes the listener know.5 4 Cf. In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Ezpositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950), where St. Thomas comments on the following phrase from Dionysius (p. 14) : "E1r ailT7]11 a11a"Yoµe110J11 a11aTaTtX7/ xe1pa"YOJ1lla" ("ad ipsam sursum actorum suscitative manuductio "). The commentary reads (p. 17, # 48) : "Further, it is necessary that man progress to better things; and as to this, he says fifthly ' suscitative manuductio sursum actorum ' i.e., those things which go up, that is, make progre"ss, 'ad Ipsam ', namely to the Divinity. [The expression] 'suscitative' manuductio, however, is used because not only can one give a helping hand to those wanting to make progress, but one can even stimulate or urge [people] to progress." All translations are my own. Cf. also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 27, art... (shrink)

Biology and history are often viewed as closely related disciplines, with biology informed by history, especially in its task of charting our evolutionary past. Maximizing the opportunities for cross-fertilization in these two fields requires an accurate reckoning of their commonalities and differences-precisely what this volume sets out to achieve. Specially commissioned essays by a team of recognized international researchers cover the full panoply of topics in these fields and include notable contributions on the correlativity of evolutionary and historical explanations, applying (...) to history the latest causal-mechanical approach in the philosophy of biology, and the question of generalized laws that might pertain across the two subjects. The collection opens with a vital interrogation of general issues on explanation that apart from potentially fruitful areas of interaction (could the etiology of the causal-mechanical perspective in biology account for the historical trajectory of the Roman Empire?) this volume also seeks to chart relative certainties distinguishing explanations in biology and history. It also assesses techniques such as the use of probabilities in biological reconstruction, deployed to overcome the inevitable gaps in physical evidence on early evolution. Methodologies such as causal graphs and semantic explanation receive in-depth analysis. Contributions from a host of prominent and widely read philosophers ensure that this new volume has the stature of a major addition to the literature. (shrink)

This paper examines various ways in which philosophy of science can be interdisciplinary. It aims to provide a map of relations between philosophy and sciences, some of which are interdisciplinary. Such a map should also inform discussions concerning the question “How much philosophy is there in the philosophy of science?” In Sect. 1, we distinguish between synoptic and collaborative interdisciplinarity. With respect to the latter, we furthermore distinguish between two kinds of reflective forms of collaborative interdisciplinarity. We also briefly explicate (...) how complexity triggers interdisciplinarity. In Sect. 2, we apply the distinctions of Sect. 1 to philosophy of science and analyze in which sense different styles of philosophy of science are interdisciplinary. The styles that we discuss are a synoptic-general, a reflective-general, a reflective-particular, a particular-embedded and a descriptive or normative style. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON REINCARNATION MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York I. INTRODUCTION AQUINAS EXPLICITLY addresses the question of whether reincarnation is possible on numerous occasions.1 Not surprisingly, his most extensive and subtle treatment of the subject is found in a work addressed to nonChristians, the Summa Contra Gentiles. Aquinas took it to be his duty as Christian philosopher to address errors which were apt to have a (...) detrimental effect on the faith of Christian believers.2 In this spirit I have undertaken the task of presenting Aquinas's philosophical arguments against reincarnation. For nowadays belief in reincarnation is becoming increasingly widespread, even among Christians, in spite of the fact that it is incompatible with belief in the resurrection of the body. My treatment of the matter will necessarily be summary, both because of the large number of arguments which Aquinas proffers, and because a full understanding of Aquinas's arguments presupposes an understanding of his teachings on natural philosophy, and especially on the soul. 1 A partial listing of the works in which Aquinas discusses reincarnation is as follows: In Super Evangelium S. Matthaei, ed. P. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1951), n. 925, Aquinas refers to transmigrationem animae. Reference is made to the Pythagorean fables on the subject in In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium (Turin: Marietti, 1959), n. 131 (hereafter cited as De Anima). Extended discussions of reincarnation are found in Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter cited as ScG), II, c. 83, ed. C. Pera, O.P., et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1961), and in Scriptum super Sententiis (hereafter cited as Sent.), IV, d. 44, q. l, a. 1 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1956). The Index Thomisticus indicates that the word "metempsychoseos" is used twice in the Catena Aurea (Matt.), but does not appear in any of Aquinas's own writings. 2 Cf. De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas. 33 34 MARIE I. GEORGE What is reincarnation? The problem in attempting to understand and to form a proper judgment about the idea of reincarnation stems from the fact that this word designates a cluster of disparate beliefs and doctrines, some popular, some philosophical, others religious. If reincarnation has always figured prominently in the religious and cultural fabric of Eastern thought, it has been less present in the West. In spite of some precedents in the past, it is only really quite recently that this idea has been gaining ground here, although in forms quite different from those of the East. The question, then, is a vast one. For this reason, among others, we intend to limit our consideration to those versions for which Western philosophers have offered a defense. Their claim is that upon death the spirits of at least certain people enter into other human bodies (generally those of newly conceived infants), or even into the bodies of lower life forms. Moreover, it is usually maintained that the kind of being one's spirit will enter after death depends upon how one has lived one's previous life. One might thus return as a queen, or as a poor and miserable person, or even as a slug, in correspondence to the goodness or evilness of one's former life. Aquinas's arguments against reincarnation are of two sorts. Sometimes he argues against what he calls the roots of a given version of the theory:' What he means by roots are positions the acceptance of which render reincarnation necessary or plausible. In showing that the roots are unsound, Aquinas refutes a given account of reincarnation, but does not refute the basic doctrine as such, for there may be some other account that would justify the belief. The other sort of argument which Aquinas gives positively establishes that reincarnation is impossible. We intend to consider here both sorts of argument.4 'Cf. IV Sent., d. 44, q. I, a. 1, sol. 1. 4 Note that Aquinas does not address the religious versions of the theory with the exception of Plato's theory which can be considered religious to the extent that it is derived from the Pythagorean mysteries. Aquinas interests himself in those theories known to him that both offer a rational account and have some plausibility. AQUINAS ON... (shrink)

Book Review Philosophy of Microbiology MAUREEN A. O’MALLEY.

If Aquinas lived today, he would accept that Darwin was correct, at leastas to the broad lines of his theory, namely, that the unfit are differentially eliminatedand chance is involved in the origin of new species. Aquinas in fact offered a similarexplanation for what he believed were spontaneously generated organisms. I intendto show that extending this sort of explanation to all species in no way affects thekey steps in the Fifth Way (e.g., “those things which lack cognition do not tendto (...) an end unless directed by someone knowing and intelligent”). Thomas himselfprovides us with the crucial points for bringing evolution by natural selectioninto accord with the Fifth Way, including the distinction between a maker anda designer (builder vs. architect), an explanation for organisms’ imperfections interms of material necessity and secondary causality, and an account of the role ofchance in the world. (shrink)

In Against Individualism, Henry Rosemont argues against a contemporary Western concept of self that takes rational autonomy to be the “core” of what it means to be a person. Rational autonomy is thought to be the only essential feature of this core self, endowing us with an independent existence and moral framework to act accordingly—as independent, rational, autonomous individuals. In marked contrast, and drawing from the Analects of Confucius, Rosemont defines personhood as consisting of social roles and their correlative responsibilities. (...) We are persons relationally, only in virtue of the roles that interdependently connect us to each other. Rosemont holds that the independent self is a chimera that leads to a problematic ethic where our connection to others is undermined instead of seen as central to who we are and how we should treat others. I argue that social roles are also chimeras that are constructed instead of metaphysically given. That is, while we are essentially social, how this plays out is variable and contingent. Moreover, I argue that we are essentially self-aware subjects—or embodied selves—whose personal experience is uniquely our own and inescapably filled with otherness. Both individualizing and socializing aspects of self are necessary as well as interdependent; moreover, favouring one over the other has both positive and negative consequences. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss some problems and prospects of interdisciplinary encounters by focusing on philosophy of science as a case study. After introducing the case, we give an overview about the various ways in which philosophy of science can be interdisciplinary in Section 2. In Section 3, we name some general problems concerning the possible points of interaction between philosophy of science and the sciences studied. In Section 4 we compare the advantages and risks of interdisciplinarity for individual researchers (...) and institutions. In Section 5, we discuss interdisciplinary PhD programs, in particular concerning two main problems: increased workload and the quality of supervision. In the final Section 6, we look at interdisciplinary careers beyond the PhD. (shrink)

The observable/unobservable distinction, realistically construed, is a feature which lies at the very heart of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. The aim of this paper is to approach it by taking a close look at van Fraassen’s concept of observation. We will argue that if van Fraassen’s most recent writings about “literate experience”, especially his remarks on the status of observation reports and his general a-metaphysical stance, are taken into account, his realistic interpretation of the observable/unobservable distinction paves the road for (...) inconsistency. In particular, we will show that a dilemma emerges to the effect that van Fraassen is forced to accept skeptical consequences blatantly at odds with constructive empiricism and its restatement of the aim of science. We will finally suggest that the only way out for van Fraassen involves giving up his realistic construal of observability and thus taking sides with constructivism. (shrink)

This paper examines a specific kind of part-whole relations that exist in the molecular genetic domain. The central question is under which conditions a particular molecule, such as a DNA sequence, is a biological part of the human genome. I address this question by analyzing how biologists in fact partition the human genome into parts. This paper thus presents a case study in the metaphysics of biological practice. I develop a metaphysical account of genomic parthood by analyzing the investigative and (...) reasoning practices in the ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNA Elements) project. My account reveals two conditions that determine whether a molecule is a part of the human genome (i.e., a genomic part). First, genomic parts must possess a causal role function in the genome as a whole, that is, their functions must contribute to the genome directing the overall functioning of the cell. Second, genomic parts must have a specific chemical structure and be actual segments of the DNA sequence of the genome. (shrink)

Probably most of us have suffered at the hands of a friend who continually turned to us for help, as well having been grieved by a friend who failed to do so on a given occasion. And we have probably been chagrinned by friends who divulge to us only the most limited knowledge about their past problems, as well as by friends who provide unnecessary information about their woeful past. The purpose of this paper is to set out Aquinas’s recommendations (...) for the moral guidelines to be followed in deciding which problems we disclose to our friends; these guidelines include: (1) not placing burdens on friends unnecessarily; (2) affording one’s friends the opportunity to do one good; (3) living in accord with one’s social nature; (4) being genuine; (5) encouraging friends struggling with moral problems; (6) bearing faith witness on occasion; (7) avoiding scandal; and (8) avoiding vices involving speech. (shrink)

What is the level of organization on which natural selection operates? Are genes, organisms or groups the entities that are selected in adaptive evolutionary processes? This book discusses recent pluralistic solutions to the problem of the units of selection. After introducing central concepts and ideas from evolutionary biology, this book constructs a novel map of the philosophical debate and locates gene selectionism, multilevel selection theory, and description pluralism on the map. The book closes with a critical discussion of different versions (...) of description pluralism and assesses their ability to solve the units of selection problem. (shrink)

Charles Darwin hat eindrucksvoll gezeigt, dass der Mensch ebenso wie alle anderen Lebewesen ein Produkt der biologischen Evolution ist. Die sich an Darwin anschließende Forschung hat außerdem plausibel gemacht, dass sich nicht nur viele der körperlichen Merkmale des Menschen, sondern auch (zumindest einige) seiner Verhaltensdispositionen in adaptiven Selektionsprozessen herausgebildet haben. Die Vorstellung, dass auch die menschliche Moralität evolutionär bedingt ist, scheint daher auf den ersten Blick ganz überzeugend. Schließlich hat die Evolutionstheorie in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten in vielen Bereichen (auch außerhalb (...) der Biologie) ihre weitreichende Bedeutung unter Beweis gestellt. Warum sollte, so könnte man beispielsweise fragen, gerade die Fähigkeit des Menschen, moralische Normen aufzustellen und gemäß ihnen zu handeln, nicht evolutionär erklärt werden können? Und warum sollte eine solche evolutionäre Erklärung der menschlichen Moralität irrelevant für die Rechtfertigung moralischer Normen sein? Warum sollte die Ethik eine Bastion der Philosophen bleiben, für die evolutionsbiologische Forschungsergebnisse über den Menschen und seine nächsten Verwandten keinerlei Relevanz besitzen? (shrink)

A correct understanding of experience is crucial for understanding the difference between human and non-human animals. Richard Sorabji interprets Aristotle to be affirming that experience in non-human animals is the same thing as a rudimentary universal, and that the individual who possesses experience achieves his goal by the application of low level univer-sals. I argue that this is neither a correct understanding of Aristotle’s statements in the Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, nor is it true to the facts. Sorabji (...) is misled, first, by the fact that experience can be regarded as a rudimentary universal in humans, and secondly by the fact that people of experience often possess universals that pertain to their actions. As to the latter, I show that people of experience do not succeed in virtue of possessing universals. As to the former, I point out that regarding experience as a rudimentary universal presupposes that the being that possesses them goes on to acquire true universals, something Sorabji fails to show. The presence of a modicum of experience in some non-human animals, thus, does not show that these beings share with us the capacity for knowledge of universals. (shrink)

Embodied Moral Psychology and Confucian Philosophy is a comprehensive and insightful book that shows how some central tenets of Confucian philosophy are supported by contemporary research in psychology. More specifically, Bongrae Seok shows “that Confucian moral philosophy is a philosophical tradition of the embodied moral mind with the potential to develop a viable theory of embodied moral psychology”. He begins part one of his book with a chapter on “What is Embodied Cognition?” saying that it generally refers to “the physical (...) mechanism of a cognitive system, in the processes of gathering, processing, storing, and accessing information”. He.. (shrink)